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that the general results on which critics now agree will be overturned." They have not only not been overturned, but their foundations have been strengthened and made more impregnable. But this acceptance of the more scientific view has been largely confined to the scholars and the more carefully trained ministry. The laymen have as a rule been too lacking in scholarly equipment and too busy to sift the more or less confused evidence involved, to be converted to a general acceptance of the new view. The consequence has therefore been a gap between the pulpit and the pews. It is just such books as this of Dr. Brightman's on the sources of the Hexateuch that are adapted to relieve this unfortunate condition. The book is especially felicitous in its presentation of results and in a form easily understood. The three large documents are given in their entirety: the Judæan or Jahvistic document, dating from about the middle of the ninth century B.C., the Ephraimitic or Elohist document, dating from about a century later, and the Priestly Code, from about 500 B.C. To each of these the author gives an introduction, descriptive of its literary characteristics, its ideals, and the home of its author or editors. Thus the reader is prepared to note how characteristically the earlier two differ from each other and how radically these two earlier accounts, which had their origin in prophetic circles of thought, differ from the theocratic tone and presentation of the later Priestly Code. Dr. Brightman's book is commended to those who are really anxious to see what the modern critical method has done for the Hexateuch. From the introduction, in which is given a brief but valuable outline of the history of the criticism, to the bibliography with which it closes, the book is marked by good scholarship and wise restraint.

MAX KELLNER.

THE EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. D. C. MACINTOSH. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xvi, 270. \$2.00.

This is an exceptionally fresh and stimulating book on theology written by the Dwight professor of Theology in Yale University. Not that its conclusions are novel, for they are substantially those of so-called Liberal Orthodoxy more squarely stated and consistently held, but it is the way of reaching them which is noteworthy. There has been much loose talk of late about experience as the basis of theology, and the empirical method as alone valid for theological construction; but little definite work of the sort indicated has actually been attempted save in the psychology of conversion. Moreover, the

use of the term has been painfully vague; where reason failed, it has sometimes been deemed sufficient to pronounce that blessed word "experience," with hushed voice and awful mien, for the exorcism of a doubting or denying spirit. But Dr. Macintosh cannot away with such nonsense, and the distinction of his book is that it does undertake to define the data and apply the methods of experience with accuracy and thoroughness. As a theologian Dr. Macintosh has at hand certain presuppositions — the existence of God as object of religious dependence, the reality of freedom, the possibility of immortality — and certain data of revelation in the person and work of Christ and in personal salvation and support, together with the laws which may be formulated on the basis of these experiences. Thus equipped, he proceeds to a closer definition of the idea of God, and to a study of providence, eschatology, and theodicy in the light of this more developed concept. Probably most readers will feel, and rightly, that the last chapter, on the problem of evil, containing the substance of an earlier publication entitled *God in a World at War*, is a remarkably vital and original contribution to theological thought.

The book is open to criticism at several points, but there is space here for only a few fundamental doubts and suggestions. Is there not just a little too much flourishing of the words "science" and "scientific"? One need not be an anti-intellectualist to wonder whether science exhausts reality and a scientific method is the only way to truth. On the other hand, a thoroughly shut-in man of science (if such a creature be not as mythical as the economic man) might fairly protest that when God (however imperfectly defined), freedom, and immortality are accepted as presuppositions, there has been a begging of the question at the outset. Perhaps a mathematician would gloat over the author's formula for determining moral value with reference (1) to the isolated wrong act, and (2) to the man as a whole, "The numerator of the fraction represents . . . the factors according to which the guilt varies directly, and the denominator the factors according to which it varies inversely," (p. 85); but a reader whose

$$(1) \frac{(EI) \cdot (EM) \cdot (PF) \cdot (SD) \cdot (gi) \cdot (gm) \cdot (GHU) \cdot (GHC) \cdot (GTU) \cdot (GTS)}{(GI) \cdot (GM) \cdot . . . (ei) \cdot (em) \cdot (EHU) \cdot (EHC) \cdot (ETU) \cdot (ETS)} \\ (2) \frac{(EI) \cdot (EM) \cdot (PF) \cdot (SD) \cdot (gi) \cdot (gm) \cdot (GHU) \cdot (EHC) \cdot (GTU) \cdot (ETS)}{(GI) \cdot (GM) \cdot . . . (ei) \cdot (em) \cdot (EHU) \cdot (GHC) \cdot (ETU) \cdot (GTS)}$$

interests are moral and religious asks in bewilderment what has become of the traditional doctrine of the simplicity of moral action, and what is the use of a formula which enables no one, least of all the sinner himself, to estimate blameworthiness? Dante's Minos would

have to be an advanced mathematician and work overtime, in order to assign the damned to their appropriate circles in hell.

How is it possible to justify the assumption constantly made that we must believe in a God adequate to the religious needs of man? Those needs are so diverse that a god adequate to them all would seem to be in danger of having no character at all. Nor is the difficulty removed by prefixing such adjectives as "real," "valid," "deep," "legitimate," which in fact simply exclude all religious needs with which the author does not sympathize. Besides, is it not possible that the need has been created by long-continued belief in a supply? Taught to rely on divine aid, men easily formulate their craving for assistance against the hostile forces of nature into an imperative need of God as all-powerful helper. There may easily be "the upbuilding of a need" by the promise of a supply. At any rate, to assume that there must be satisfaction for all the "deepest" needs of man is quite too much of a presupposition to be thoroughly scientific.

The chief criticism, however, concerns the transition from psychology to ontology. In the intricate and baffling complex of religious experience, can it be positively affirmed that elements are included which demand an objective factor for their explanation? It may be true that in ordinary experience, objects and not ideas are immediate data, or that it is sufficient to plead an "ontological consciousness" in proof of an external world, but in religious experience the case is not so clear. As the author often says, right relations must be established if the experience is to ensue; but such a right relation is of course a psychological state, and a psychological condition as predisposing cause may turn out to be a sufficient effective cause of the experience which follows. One is tempted to employ the author's method in other ways and with respect to other experiences. To say nothing of the help and healing which often follow prayers directed to the Virgin or the saints, there are experiences of temptation in which one seems beset by an alien power enticing, even compelling, to evil. Shall we argue from such experiences to the reality of evil spirits and of Satan? Dr. Macintosh recognizes this peril at the very close of the book but does not offer a satisfactory reply. Perhaps those who accused disbelievers in the devil with atheism could have made out a good case on the basis and by the methods of empirical theology.

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